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BREARD v. PRUETT
134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998)
United States Court Of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACIS
On February 17,1992, at approximately 10:30 p.m.,Ann
Isch heard her upstairs neighbor, Ruth Dickie, and a man
arguing loudly in the hal.I Dickie, a thirty-nine year old
unmarried woman, lived alone in an Arlington County apart-
ment. As the arguing continued, Isch heard the man enter
Dickie's apartment. She subsequently called Joseph King, the
apartment complex maintenance person.When King went to
check on Dickie, he knocked on the door and heard what he
thought was someone being dragged across the floor. After
no one answered his knocking, King called the police.2
The police arrived, and using King's master key, entered
Dickie's apartment. They found her naked from the waist
down, lying on the floor on her back.3 Dickie was bleeding,
and according to the police, did not seem to be breathing.4
According to the autopsy report, Dickie had been stabbed in
the neck five times with two of the wounds being fatal.' Based
on other findings in the autopsy report, the police were able
to place Angel Francisco Breard in Dickie's apartment."
Despite the forensic evidence, the police suspected
Breard only after he came to their attention as a result of
another crime.7 Breard was subsequently indicted on
charges of the attempted rape and capital murder of Dickie.8 In
'Breard v. Pruett, 134 E3d 615,617 (4th Cir. 1998).
2Breard, 134 E3d at 617.
3Id.
IThe police made the following observations at the crime scene:
(1) there was body fluid on Dickie's pubic hair and on her inner thigh;
(2) there were hairs clutched in her hands and on one of her legs; (3)
her underpants had been ripped from her body, (4) there was a blood-
stained telephone receiver near her head, (5) a missing lens from
Dickie's eyeglasses was found under her body, (6) Dickie's pants were
missing some buttons; (7) her purse was on the floor just inside the
front door;, and (8) her keys were on the floor between her legs.Breard
v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68,72-73,445 S.E.2d 670,674 (1994).
'Breard, 134 E3d at 617.
6
1he autopsy report on Dickie contained the following findings.
First, hairs found on Dickie's body were found to be identical in all
microscopic characteristics to hair samples taken from Breard. Id.
Second, the semen found on Dickie's pubic hair matched Breard's
enzyme typing in every respect, and Breard's DNA profile matched
the DNA profile of the semen found on Dickie's body.IdAdditionalty,
Breard'sArgentinean nationality strengthened this physical evidence,
in that his DNA profile occurs in only one in seventeen million mem-
bers of the Hispanic population. Breard, 248 Va. at 73, 445 S.E.2d at
674. Moreover, only 1.7 percent of the general population possesses
the same enzyme type as Breard.Id at 73,445 S.E.2d at 674.
70n August 17, 1992, police answered a call reporting screams
from Breard's Arlington apartment. Upon arrival, the police found
JeanineYvonna Price, naked and hysterical, and Breard wearing only
his undershorts. Breard and Price had met in Washington, D.C., and
testifying at his jury trial, Breard offered the following account
of the events that took place on February 17,1992. He testified
that, on the night in question, he left his apartment, armed with
a knife, with the intent of"'try[ing] to do someone:" meaning
that he"wanted to use the knife to force a woman to have sex
with [him]." 9 Breard confessed that he talked to Dickie on the
street, followed her to her apartment, argued with her, and then
forced himself into her apartment. In testifying, Breard also
detailed how he stabbed Dickie, took off her pants, and got"'on
top of her.'" 10 Upon hearing a knock at the door, Breard became
frightened, and escaped through a kitchen window"
The jury convicted Breard of both the attempted rape
and capital murder charges. 2 For the rape conviction, the jury
gave Breard ten years' imprisonment and a $100,000 fine.
After hearing evidence in aggravation and mitigation of the
capital murder charge during the sentencing phase, the jury
fixed Breard's sentence at death based upon findings of both
future dangerousness and vileness of the crime. 3 The trial
then traveled together to Breard's apartment. Breard had then
attempted to sexually assault Price, removing her clothing, striking
her, and telling her that he intended to have anal intercourse with
her. The police arrested Breard, and, at that time, made him a sus-
pect in Dickle's murder. Id at 85,445 S.E.2d at 680.
8Breard, 134 E3d at 617.
9Breard, 248Va. at 73,445 S.E.2d at 674 (quoting trial record).
IOd. at 73,445 S.E.2d at 674 (quoting trial record).
Id. at 73, 445 S.E.2d at 674. Breard also testified that, at the
time of the attack, he believed that he was under a curse placed
upon him by his ex-wife's father.
'2Breard, 134 F3d at 617.
'31d. During the sentencing phase, the Commonwealth present-
ed evidence that in addition to Dickie and Price, Breard had attacked
another woman. Breard v. Commonwealth, 248Va. 68, 85,445 S.E.2d
670, 680 (1994). Three weeks prior to Dickie's murder, Breard
assaulted Celia Gonzales on a street inArlington County. He grabbed
Gonzales from behind and forced her to go with him, telling her he
had a gun.After someone noticed what was going on, Breard released
Gonzales, but not before telling her he knew where she lived and he
was going to have someone get her later. Id at 85,445 S.E. at 680. In
response, the defense presented the following mitigating evidence.
First, Breard testified that he had become very religious since his
arrest, praying often, including prayers for Dickie and her mother. Id.
at 85,445 S.E.2d at 680. Second, a volunteer for Good News Mission,
a Bible-teaching organization, testified that Breard goes to his Bible
study class twice a week, and has had a genuine conversion to
Christianity. Id. at 85-86,445 S.E.2d at 680. Finally, Breard's mother
testified that when he was five years old, her son had been in a trau-
matic car accident, and that some years later, he had been seriously
injured in another car accident. Additionally, Breard's father died
when Breard was eighteen years old. More recently, according to his
mother, Breard's failed marriage had lead to many problems, includ-
ing excessive drinking. Id at 86,445 S.E.2d at 680-81.
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court sentenced Breard accordingly. The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed Breard's convictions and sentences,14 and the
United States Supreme Court then denied Breard's petition for
a writ of certiorari.'
5
Breard filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
Circuit Court for Arlington County, seeking state collateral
relief'16 Two months later the circuit court dismissed Breard's
petition, and the Supreme Court ofVirginia subsequently refused
the petition for appeal. OnAugust 30,1996, Breard filed another
petition for writ of habeas corpus, this time in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District ofVirginia, seeking federal
collateral relief. After the district court denied relief,7 Breard
filed a timely notice of appeal. Consequently, the district court
granted Breard's application for a certificate of appealability con-
cerning all of the issues Breard raised in his application. 8
Breard now appeals the district court's denial of his peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus, raising the following issues:
(1) whether The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act ("AEDPA), specifically the amended Chapter 153 provi-
sions and the newly created Chapter 154 provisions, applies
to Breard's appeal;19 (2) whether his convictions and sen-
tences should be vacated because, at the time of his arrest,
Virginia authorities failed to notify him that, as a foreign
national, he had the right to contact his consulate under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations;" and (3) whether
the aggravating circumstances instructions given by the trial
court were unconstitutionally vague.2
HOLDING
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
denial of Breard's petition for writ of habeas corpus, hold-
ing that: (1) the amended Chapter 153 provisions under the
AEDPA apply, but the new Chapter 154 provisions do not
apply;22 (2) Breard is entitled to no relief on his Vienna
Convention claim;23 and (3) Breard's claim of an unconsti-
tutional aggravating circumstances instructions is denied.24
"Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 445 S.E. 2d 670 (Va.
1994).
"Breard v. Virginia, 513 U.S. 971 (1994).
16Breard, 134 E3d at 618.
17Breard v. Netherland, 949 ESupp. 1255 (E.D.Va. 1996).




22Breard, 134 E3d at 618.
2Id. at 620.
241d. at 621. On appeal, Breard raised the issue of whether his
death sentence violated Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
(holding that under then-existing state capital sentencing
schemes, death penalty was being imposed arbitrarily, discrimina-
torily, and wantonly, and therefore imposition of death penalty vio-
lated Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment). Although this issue will not be discussed in this case
summary it is important to note the court's ruling on it. Breard
made three arguments under his Furman claim: (1) given the pros-
ecutor's alleged offer to forego the death penalty if Breard would
ANAIYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act ("AEDPA")
The AEDPA, which became effective on April 24, 1996,
amended parts of Chapter 153 which provides procedures for
federal habeas review.2S In Lindh v. Murphy,' the United States
Supreme Court held that § 107(c) of theAEDPA, which provided
that Chapter 154 applied to cases pending on the effective date
of theAEDPA, produced a"'negative implication.. that the new
provisions of Chapter 153 generally apply only to cases filed after
theAct became effective""27Therefore,under Lindh, a habeas peti-
tion filed beforeApril 24,1996,is subject to the pre-AEDPA habeas
standards, and a petition filed afterApril 24,1996, falls under the
provisions of Chapter 1533. In addition, theAEDPA created a new
Chapter 154 which governs habeas proceedings against a state in
capital cases.9 Application of Chapter 154 depends on whether
a state "opts in"by instituting certain mechanisms for the appoint-
ment and compensation of competent counsel20
plead guilty, the prosecutor violated his constitutional tights by seek-
ing and obtaining a death sentence once Breard insisted upon plead-
ing not guilty; (2) the Commonwealth of Virginia imposes the death
penalty arbitrarily in capital murder cases; and (3) his death sentence
is unconstitutionally disproportionate. Breard 134 F.3d at 621.The
first two claims were not raised in state court, and the third claim had
been procedurally barred by the Supreme Court offirginia on appeal
from the denial of state habeas relief. Id. Therefore, the court of
appeals found that it could not address the merits of any of these
claims because Breard had neither established "cause" for the proce-
dural default of these claims, nor proven that a miscarriage of justice
would result if the court failed to consider any of the claims. Id
211d. at 618.See Raymond, The Incredible Shrinking Writ, Cap.
Def.J.,Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 52 and Eade, The Incredible Shrinking Writ,
Part II, Cap. Def.J.,Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 55 (summaries of habeas corpus
before AEDPA and APEDA's major provisions, including amend-
ments to Chapter 153).
-6117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997).
27Breard, 134 E3d at 618 (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S.Ct.
2059,2068 (1997)).
1Id. at 618.
29See Raymond, The Incredible Shrinking Writ, Cap. Def. J.,
Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 52 and Eade, The Incredible Shrinking Writ, Part
H, Cap. Def.J.,Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 55 (discussing habeas corpus before
AEDPA and AEDPA's major provisions, including Chapter 154).
10Breard, 134 F3d at 618.To qualify as an"opt-in" state, a state
must satisfy the following requirements:
(1) The State must establish by statute, rule of its court of last
resort, or other agency authorized by state law a mechanism for
the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable liti-
gation expenses of competent counsel in state post-conviction
proceedings brought by indigent capital defendants.
(2) Such mechanism must provide standards of competen-
cy for the appointment of such counsel.
(3) Such mechanism must affirmatively offer counsel to all
state prisoners under capital sentence.
(4) Such mechanism must provide for the entry of a court
order either appointing counsel to each indigent capital defen-
dant, or explaining that such an appointment was not made on
the basis that a defendant was not indigent or rejected the offer
of counsel with an understanding of the legal consequences.
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In applying these principles of the AEDPA, the court of
appeals first decided that the Chapter 153 provisions apply to
Breard's case because he filed his federal habeas petition on
August 30,1996,nearly four months after the effective date of the
AEDPA- 31 The court of appeals then analyzed whether the
Chapter 154 provisions applied to Breard's case, and found that
they did not 2 In Breard v. Netherlan43 3 the district court held
that the Chapter 154 provisions did not apply because the
Commonwealth of Virginia has not satisfied the "opt-in" provi-
sions of the AEDPA-2 Specifically, Virginia has not met the first
"opt-in" requirement, in that it has not created an appropriate
mechanism for the appointment and payment of counsel. The
court of appeals reasoned that because the Commonwealth of
Virginia did not appeal this ruling, it would not consider the issue
of whether~irginia satisfies the"opt-in"provisions of theAEDPA.-'
Nonetheless, the court of appeals notedwith confidence, that the
"opt-in" provisions would be of no help to Breard anyway.
Capital defense counsel should be aware of the filing
date of the federal habeas petition.The filing date will deter-
mine whether capital cases will be subject to the pre-AEDPA
habeas standards or the amended provisions of Chapter 153.
Also, it is important to note that the court of appeals here
reaffirms Virginia's ongoing failure to satisfy the requirements
of the"opt-in"provisions of theAEDPAAs of the decision date
of this case, Virginia has still not met all four of the criteria
necessary to be considered an "opt-in" state. Consequently,
the provisions of Chapter 154, under the AEDPA, cannot be
applied to capital cases in Virginia.
H. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
36
A. The Procedural Default of Breard's Vienna
Convention Claim
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations was
unanimously adopted by the more than 100 participating
countries, including the United States, on April 24, 1963Y3'
Under the Vienna Convention, a citizen of one country who
is arrested in another country is given the right to contact
the country's consul, and, consequently, the counsel is
allowed to visit the detainee and provide assistance.-
Breard possesses dual citizenship in both Argentina
Breard v. Netherland, 949 ESupp. 1255,1261 (E.D.Va. 1996) (citing
Satcher v. Netherland, 944 ESupp. 1222,1238 (E.D.Va. 1996)).
31Breard, 134 E3d at 618.
321d.
33949 ESupp. 1255 (E.D.Va. 1996).
mId. at 1262.
3"Breard, 134 E3d at 618.
'Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,Apr. 24, 1963,21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (hereinafter Vienna Convention). See
also Case Summary of Murphy, Cap. Def.J.,Vol. 10,No. 1,p. 17.
3 'Uribe, Consuls at Work: Universal Instruments of Human
Rights and Consular Protection in the Context of Criminal
Justice, 19 Hous.J. INT'L L. 375, 384 (1997).
-'Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,Apr. 24, 1963,21
U.S.T. 77, 100-01,596 U.N.T.S. 261,292-94.
and Paraguay.39 Therefore, using the Vienna Convention,
Breard argued that his convictions and sentences should
be vacated because when he was arrested the Arlington
County authorities did not tell him that, as a foreign
national, he had the right to contact either the Consulate
39Republic of Paraguay v.Allen, 134 E3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998),
is a case which stemmed from the arrest and conviction of Angel
Francisco Breard. The Republic of Paraguay (hereinafter
"Paraguay") and its Ambassador and Consul General to the United
States sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the
Governor and other officials of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Republic of Paraguay v.Allen, 949 ESupp. 1269,1271-72 (E.D.Va.
1996). Specifically, Paraguay sought the following: (1) a declaration
of violation by the Commonwealth of treaties between Paraguay
and the United States; (2) the vacatur of a capital conviction and
death sentence imposed by the Commonwealth on a Paraguayan
national in alleged violation of the treaties; and (3) an injunction
against further violations. Id. at 1271-72. The district court
determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over
the case and dismissed it pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), and Paraguay appealed.Republic of Paraguay
v.Allen, 134 E3d at 624.
The events leading up to this case began with the arrest of
Breard onAugust 17,1992, by theArlington,Virginia police on suspi-
cion of the murder of Ruth Dickie. Id At the time of his arrest, the
Arlington authorities did not inform Breard of any right to contact
the Paraguayan consulate to confer with it throughout his detention
and trial.The Circuit Court ofArlington County appointed two attor-
neys to represent Breard. After a jury trial, Breard was convicted of
attempted rape and murder, and subsequently sentenced to death. At
no point in his direct appeal did Breard claim that the
Commonwealth had violated any treaty provision while he was
detained or on trial. Id. at 624-25. After being appointed new coun-
sel for his state habeas corpus proceedings, Breard again failed to
assert violations of any treaty. At some time after January 1996,
Paraguay's ambassador and general counsel became aware of
Breard's conviction and sentence, and consequently sought to con-
sult with Breard as provided for by certain international treaties. Id.
at 625.The Commonwealth complied, and"Paraguay's officers have
been given free access to Breard since that time: Id.
Paraguay and its officials alleged that Paraguay's separate rights
under the Vienna Convention and the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation (an 1859 treaty signed by the United
States and Paraguay) had been violated by the Commonwealth's fail-
ure to advise Breard of his rights under the treaties and to notify the
Paraguayan consulate of Breard's arrest, conviction and sentence. Id.
at 625-26. Paraguay's suit included a joint claim based directly upon
Paraguay's treaty rights, and a parallel claim, on behalf ofJoseAntonio
Dos Santos, Paraguay's Consul General to the United States. Under 42
U.S.C. section 1983,Dos Santos alleged a denial of his rights under fed-
eral treaty law by the actions of Commonwealth officials taken under
color of state law. Id at 626.The district court found that Paraguay and
its officials had standing to bring their claims, stressing that Paraguay
was asserting its own rights, and not those of Breard. Similarly, the dis-
trict court determined that Dos Santos had standing to bring his sec-
tion 1983 claim. The district court ultimately dismissed the action,
however, holding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Id
The petitioners were not claiming a "'continued violation of federal
law," and consequently could not bring an Ex parte Young action in
order to qualify for immunity under the EleventhAmendment.
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of Argentina or the Consulate of Paraguay.40 The district
court rejected this argument, finding that Breard never
raised this claim in state court, that the claim was proce-
durally defaulted, and that Breard failed to establish
cause to excuse the default .
4
A habeas claim is procedurally defaulted when: (1) the
petitioner does not exhaust all available state remedies; and
(2) the court to which the petitioner would have had to
present the claim to satisfy the exhaustion requirement,
would now find the claim procedurally barred.4 2 Virginia
On appeal, the court of appeals considered only the Eleventh
Amendment ground of the district court's dismissal of the action for
lack of subject matterjurisdiction. Idt at 626. The EleventhAmendment
provides for sovereign immunity, "'a constitutional limitation on the
federal judicial power'" over certain actions against States and state offi-
cials. Id at 627. (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984)). However, Exparte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908), establishes an exception to this immunity, providing
that federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over claims against state
officials by persons at risk of or suffering from violations by those offi-
cials of federally protected rights, if (1) the violation for which relief is
sought is ongoing and (2) the relief sought is only prospective. Id at
149-50. Therefore, the issues on appeal were whether the violations
alleged by Paraguay are "ongoing" and whether the relief sought is only
"prospective: On the first issue, the court of appeals held that the vio-
lation alleged by Paraguay was not ongoing underExparte Youngfind-
ing that the actual violation alleged, Paraguay's denial of its rights under
the treaties cited, was a past event that was not itself continuing.
Republic of Paraguay, 134 E3d at 627. With regard to the second
issue, the court held that the essential relief sought was not prospec-
tive, in that the only relief sought, the voiding of Breard's final state con-
viction and sentence, was quintessentially retrospective. Id at 626.
Moreover, the only possible effect of the relief sought would be to
undo a completed state action, and not to provide prospective relief
against the continuation of the past violation. Id Despite the judicial
Late of Paraguay's action, the court of appeals did include a paragraph
in its opinion which specifically addressed the Commonwealth's com-
pliance, or lack of, with the Vienna Convention.The court of appeals
stated,"We share the district court's expressed 'disenchantment' with
the Commonwealth's conceded past violation of Paraguay's treaty
rights.There are disturbing implications in that conduct for larger inter-
ests of the United States and its citizens" Id at 629 (quoting Republic
of Paraguay v.A len, 949 ESupp. 1269,1273 (E.D.Va. 1996)).The court
also noted that what it found even more disturbing was that this was
not the only disclosed violation. Id at 629, n. 7 (citing Murphy v.
Netherland 116 E3d 97 (4th Cir. 1997)). Defense counsel can and
should use this expressed disapproval of the actions of the
Commonwealth in light of the rights provided for by international
treaties when representing foreign nationals. Even more importantl,
capital defense counsel must preserve theseVienna Convention claims
for appeal, beginning at the trial court level. There is a strong implica-
tion in this opinion that, if properly preserved, the Vienna Convention
issue could be a winning issue for a capital defendant.
"OBreard, 134 E3d at 618-19.
4"Breard v.Netherland, 949 ESupp. 1255,1263 (E.D.Va. 1996).
"Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,735 (1991). A federal
habeas claim can also be procedurally defaulted if a state court
clearly and expressly bases its dismissal of a habeas petitioner's
claim on a state procedural rule that provides an independent and
adequate ground for the dismissal. Id. at 731-32.
law stipulates that "'a petitioner is barred from raising
any claim in a successive petition if the facts as to that
claim were either known or available to petitioner at the
time of his original petition.'" 3 Breard asserted that he
could not have made his Vienna Convention claim until
April 1996, when the United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit decided Faulder v.Johnson,44 because until
that time, the claim was virtually unknown. In Faulder,
the court of appeals held that an arrestee's rights under
the Vienna Convention were violated when Texas author-
ities did not inform him of his right to contact the
Canadian consulate, but the omission was found to be
harmless error." Furthermore, Breard argued that he
could not have raised his Vienna Convention claim dur-
ing state habeas because Virginia failed to notify him of
his rights under the Vienna Convention.
4 6
The court of appeals found that these assertions
were insufficient to show that the facts which Breard
needed to make his Vienna Convention claim were
unavailable to him when he filed his state habeas peti-
tion.47 Citing Murphy v. Netherland,48 the court of
appeals renewed its rejection of a state habeas petition-
er's argument that the novelty of a Vienna Convention
claim and the state's failure to inform the petitioner of
his rights under the Vienna Convention was sufficient
cause for the failure to raise the claim in state court.4 9 As
it did in Murphy, the court found that "a reasonably dili-
gent attorney would have discovered the applicability of
the Vienna Convention to a foreign national defendant
and that in previous cases claims under the Vienna
Convention have been raised."5 Therefore, the court
concluded that Breard's Vienna Convention claim would
be procedurally defaulted if he tried to raise it in state
court at this time.
Based upon this conclusion, the court of appeals
could only consider the Vienna Convention claim if
Breard "'c[ould] demonstrate cause for the default and
actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of
federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the
claim w[ould] result in a fundamental miscarriage of
'Breard, 134 E3d at 619 (quoting Hoke v. Netherland, 92
E3d 1350, 1354 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1996). See also Va. Code Ann. §
8.01-654(B)(2) (Michie 1950 & Supp. 1997).
1181 E3d 515 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 487
(1996).
"Id. at 520.
'6Breard, 134 E3d at 619.
47Id.
40116 E3d 97 (4th Cir. 1997). See Case Summary of Murphy,
Cap. Def.J.,Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 17.
"Breard, 134 E3d at 619.
''Id. at 619-20.
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justice'" 51 To show "cause," Breard had to establish "that
some objective factor external to the defense impeded
counsel's efforts" to make a timely claim in state court.
52
The court found that Breard failed to make such a
showing, in that the factual basis for which Breard
needed to make his Vienna Convention claim was avail-
able to him at the time he filed his state habeas peti-
tion.5 3 Once the court found that Breard failed to show
"cause," it stated that it was unnecessary to consider the
issue of "prejudice: 54 Therefore, the court found that
Breard was foreclosed from obtaining any relief under
his Vienna Convention claim.
B. A Rare, but Hopeful Concurring Opinion
The concurring opinion in Breard v. Pruett agreed that
Breard should be denied all requested relief, but its under-
lying emphasis seemed to be the importance of the Vienna
Convention. The opinion began with a quote from the
Vienna Convention, stating that the treaty facilitates "'friend-
ly relations among nations, irrespective of their differing
constitutional and social systems.' 5 5 It recognized that the
Vienna Convention is a"self-executing treaty," in that it pro-
vides rights to individuals, namely the right of consular
notice and assistance, and does not merely list the respon-
sibilities of the signing countries. The concurrence
impressed that the Vienna Convention deserves the same
respect as an act of Congress. Furthermore, the Vienna
Convention is binding upon the states because the
Supremacy Clause demands that states uphold rights grant-
ed by a treaty.5 The opinion unequivocally stated that the
511d. at 620 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750).The court of
appeals found it unnecessary to consider the issue of whether the
AEDPA revoked the "miscarriage of justice" exception to the pro-
cedural default doctrine. Under Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,
495-96 (1986), the "miscarriage of justice" exception is available
to those petitioners who are actually innocent of the offense
charged. Furthermore, under Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 350
(1992), the"miscarriage of justice" exception can be used by peti-
tioners who are actually ineligible for the death penalty. For
instance, the exception can be applied by those petitioners who
prove by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the consti-
tutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the peti-
tioner eligible for the death penalty.The Breard court noted that
even if the AEDPA does not abolish the "miscarriage of justice"
exception, no miscarriage of justice occurred here. Moreover, the
court stated that Breard did not make a showing that he was actu-
ally innocent of the offense committed, under Murphy, or ineligi-
ble for the death penalty, under Sawyer. Id. at 620.
12Id. at 620 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488
(1986)).
"Breard, 134 E3d at 620.
511d. (citing Kornabrens v. Evatt, 66 E3d 1350, 1359 (4th Cir.
1995)).
551d at 621 (ButznerJ., concurring) (quoting Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations,Apr. 24,1963,21 U.S.T. 78,79).
5Id. at 622 (citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99
(1884); U.S. Const. art.VI, cl. 2).
Vienna Convention provisions should be applied prior to
trial when they can be properly considered because collat-
eral review is too limited to provide a suitable remedy."
According to the concurrence, the Vienna Convention
protections are not limited to foreign nationals, as in this
case. These protective measures also extend to United
States citizens.As the opinion stated,"United States citizens
are scattered about the world--as missionaries, Peace
Corps volunteers, doctors, teachers and students, as travel-
ers for business and for pleasure.Their freedom and safety
are seriously endangered if state officials fail to honor the
Vienna Convention and other nations follow their exam-
ple.5The concurring justice reminded public officials that
"'international law is founded upon mutuality and reciproc-
ity.'"59 This reminder extended to the states, including
Virginia, along with a warning that the State Department
had in fact advised the states of their obligations under the
Vienna Convention. The implication is that states will not
be able to use the excuse of ignorance in any future claims
of violations of the Vienna Convention. Furthermore, the
opinion named prosecutors and defense attorneys as judi-
cial actors who should be aware of the rights and responsi-
bilities stemming from the Vienna Convention.The concur-
rence concluded with the following mandate:"[t]he impor-
tance of the Vienna Convention cannot be overstated. It
should be honored by all nations that have signed the treaty
and all states of this nation
y60
C. A New Light on the Vienna Convention
The decisions of Breard v. Pruett and Republic of
Paraguay v.Allen 6 each offer some exciting new"ammuni-
tion" for capital defense counsel representing foreign
nationals. It is clear from the ideas expressed in these opin-
ions that the judiciary is not pleased with the increasing
number of claims that the Commonwealth of Virginia and
its public officials have violated the Vienna Convention.
There is a growing recognition that the rights and obliga-
tions under the Vienna Convention are intended to be reci-
procal, and if the United States is not satisfying its end of the
bargain, there is no incentive for other countries to do so.
The Vienna Convention is not some far removed interna-
tional treaty that has little effect on the individual United
States citizen. Quite the contrary, this treaty is something
that should be very important to any U.S. citizen who is
thinking about traveling abroad, is currently in a foreign
country, or has loved ones in foreign places. One can only
imagine how terrifying it must be to be detained, arrested,
tried, and convicted in a foreign country with no contact
from a fellow countryperson. The court of appeals, in
Breard and Republic of Paraguay, seems to have imagined
'7Breard, 134 E3d at 622.
13Id.
191d.(quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,228 (1985)).
60Id.
6tSee supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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a similar scenario, and as a result, has issued some stern
warnings to the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Defense counsel should use this stern language in
support of its Vienna Convention claims, particularly for
tactical purposes in negotiating with prosecutors.
Furthermore, these opinions only supplement the already
strong implication that if capital defense counsel, repre-
senting foreign nationals, can make these Vienna
Convention claims early, the judiciary would support for-
eign national defendants whose international rights had
been violated.
III. The Aggravating Circumstances Jury
Instructions
Breard also argued that the trial court's aggravating
circumstances instructions, both for the vileness aggra-
vator and the future dangerousness aggravator, were
unconstitutionally vague."' The court noted that the
claim was not procedurally barred because the Supreme
Court of Virginia had rejected it on direct appeal.
63
However, the court of appeals ultimately rejected
Breard's constitutional attack of the aggravating circum-
stances instructions, finding that precedent demanded
such a conclusion.
The court relied upon two cases, Bennett v.
Angelone" and Spencer v. Murray," and it emphasized
that Breard, in his brief, acquiesced that the instructions
upheld in these cases were "similar" to those given at his
trial." In Bennett, the court rejected a vagueness chal-
lenge to the Commonwealth of Virginia's vileness aggra-
vating circumstance. 67 The Bennett court stated that it
had recently upheld the constitutionality of "the precise
instruction given in this case" in Tuggle v. Thompson,"
and therefore, Bennett's attack failed.69 Similarly, in
Spencer, the court rejected a vagueness attack on the
future dangerousness aggravator.71 Spencer argued that
62Breard, 134 E3d at 621.
631d.
192 E3d 1336 (4th Cir. 1996).
655 E3d 758 (4th Cir. 1993).
"Breard, 134 E3d at 621.
"7Bennett, 92 E3d at 1345.The following instruction was
given at Bennett's trial:
Before the penalty can be fixed at death, the
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt ... 2) That [the defendant's] conduct in com-
mitting the offense was outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the vic-
tim beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish
the act of murder.
Id. at 1345 n.8.
the provision concerning the future dangerousness
aggravating factor7' had not been meaningfully interpret-
ed by the Supreme Court of Virginia, and that the provi-
sion failed to "channel the jury's discretion in sentenc-
ing.' 72 The court repudiated these arguments, stating that
it had rejected "an almost identical challenge" in a previ-
ous case, and would not now depart from its precedent.
In using these precedents concerning aggravating
circumstances jury instructions to reject challenges
such as Breard's, the court of appeals did not clearly
state that the precedent jury instructions are in fact
identical to the instructions used in current challenges.
Rather, the instructions are "similar" and "almost identi-
cal." Capital defense counsel can craft an argument that
when reviewing jury instructions, particularly under
challenges of vagueness, the court should only apply
precedent if the instructions used in the previous cases
contain the exact wording as the challenged instruc-
tions.The diction, punctuation, and structuring of a jury
instruction are all crucial points when challenging an
instruction because one word choice or one comma
could affect the way a juror interprets an instruction.
Therefore, arguably one jury instruction should only be
judged against another if the two are identical.
Summary and analysis by:
Mary K. Martin
-57 E3d 1356, 1371-74 (4th Cir. 1995).
69Bennett, 92 E3d at 1345.70
7'Spencer, 5 E3d at 764-65.
"1Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1990). The statute
reads:
In assessing the penalty of any person convict-
ed of an offense for which the death penalty
may be imposed, a sentence of death shall not
be imposed unless the court or jury shall ...
find that there is a probability that the defen-
dant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society ....
' 2Spencer, 5 E3d at 764.
